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Abstract: With with the rapid development of very large, diverse, complex, and distributed datasets generated
from internet transactions, emails, videos, business information systems, manufacturing industry, sensors and
internet of things etc., cloud and big data computation have emerged as a cornerstone of modern applications.
Indeed, on the one hand, cloud and big data applications are becoming a main driver for economic growth.
On the other hand, cloud and big data techniques may threaten people and enterprises’ privacy and security
due to ever increasing exposure of their data to massive access. In this paper, aiming at providing secure cloud
data sharing services in cloud storage, we propose a scalable and controllable cloud data sharing framework
for cloud users (called: Scanf). To this end, we introduce a new cryptographic primitive, namely, PRE+,
which can be seen as the dual of traditional proxy re-encryption (PRE) primitive. All the traditional PRE
schemes until now require the delegator (or the delegator and the delegatee cooperatively) to generate the
re-encryption keys. We observe that this is not the only way to generate the re-encryption keys, the encrypter
also has the ability to generate re-encryption keys. Based on this observation, we construct a new PRE+
scheme, which is almost the same as the traditional PRE scheme except the re-encryption keys generated by
the encrypter. Compared withPRE, ourPRE+ scheme can easily achieve the non-transferable property and
message-level based fine-grained delegation. Thus our Scanf framework based on PRE+ can also achieve
these two properties, which is very important for users of cloud storage sharing service. We also roughly
evaluate our PRE+ scheme’s performance and the results show that our scheme is efficient and practica for
cloud data storage applications.
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Message-level based fine-grained delegation.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays cloud computation has become commonplace for data storage, processing, service sharing for individuals,
institutions, and enterprises world wide. As regards the computation and processing, the core novelty of this
technology is its ability of enabling heavy computation tasks, which can be distributed to large slave computation
nodes under the management of master computation nodes, like the system structure of Map-Reduce. Scalability
in its vertical and horizontal dimensions, is the essential property of cloud computation, while enterprises can
maintain their data warehouse and run information systems on it in the cloud just like running the local information
systems. Cloud computing is also referred to as 5th utility computing as it enables end-users to use and pay the
cloud storage/computation service just like using gas, water and electrical power utilities. Generally speaking, in the
Cloud services are offered through the paradigm of “Everything as a Aservice", an examples of this are Software-as-
a-Service (SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) and Data-as-a-Service (DaaS),
to name a few.
1.1 Proxy Re-encryption for Secure Cloud Data Sharing Service
Here we focus on a very common kind of cloud service: Data-as-a-Service (DaaS), aimed at providing convenient
data storage and sharing service for data owners. Data owners like individuals, institutions and enterprises
can outsource their data to the cloud server without maintaining the local data copy and the complicated
software/hardware management. However, when data owners outsource their data to the cloud, they run some risks
on the privacy and security of their data hosted at cloud data centres. Thus, it is often a reasonable practice to
first encrypt the data locally and then outsource the ciphertexts to the cloud. However, although in this way the
outsourced data can be secure, but it becomes more difficult to operate with the data such as sharing the encrypted
data, processing and mining, etc..
In order to enable sharing data among cloud data users, recently researchers have proposed a new data sharing
framework based on a cryptographic primitive named proxy re-encryption. Proxy re-encryption (PRE), allows a
semi-trusted proxy to transform a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into the one which can be decrypted by
Bob. The proxy inPRE is given a re-encryption key with which he/she can perform the conversion without knowing
the corresponding plaintexts. A PRE scheme is bidirectional if the proxy can use the re-encryption key to divert
ciphertexts from Alice to Bob and vice versa. Otherwise, it is called unidirectional. According to how the conversion
is performed,PRE can be classified as multi-hop and single-hop. A multi-hopPRE scheme supports “re-encryption
chain", namely any ciphertexts converted by the proxy during the re-encryption phase can be re-encrypted to the
ciphertexts of someone else. In other words, the re-encryption phase in multi-hop PRE can be conducted as many
times as needed. This differs from a single-hop PRE scheme, where ciphertexts converted by the proxy cannot be
re-encrypted again.
1.2 The Dilemma
We can roughly see how to use PRE for secure cloud data sharing service and its dilemma from Fig. 1. First we
describe a typical scenario for secure sharing cloud storage by using PRE as follows:
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1. Data owner Company TaoBao want to use cloud services for managing its very large business related data sets,
such as the consumers’ preference, products selling prices, analytics of logistics for goods etc. These data sets
are very sensitive and the Company TaoBao is not willing to outsource them in plaintext form. Thus, it prefers
to first encrypt the data sets file by using block cipher such as AES and then encrypt the block cipher key K
by using public key TaoBao, after that it outsources the ciphertexts to the cloud.
2. Later, the Company TaoBao signs a contract on data sharing with another business, the Company 360, for
evaluating its information system and data warehouse’s security. Certainly the Company TaoBao is not willing
to directly share its secret key skTaoBao with the Company 360. Proxy re-encryption is a good mechanism for
this purpose. Company TaoBao just computes the re-encryption key rkTaoBao→360 by using its secret key and
the Company 360’s public key, and outsources it to the cloud.
3. The cloud re-encrypts the ciphertext from (EK(file)||ETaoBao(K)) to be (EK(file)||E360(K)) and sends
them to data user Company 360. After obtaining these ciphertexts, it can decrypt them by using his own secret
key and thus can run its evaluation. Furthermore, data owner Company TaoBao can use conditional proxy
re-encryption, which is a variant of PRE for fine-grained control on the sharing content for the Company 360.
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Figure 1 PRE for secure cloud data sharing service and its dilemma
Almost all existing frameworks of PRE for secure cloud data sharing service follow the above paradigm.
However, there is a dilemma these proposals have to face to, which can be described as follows:
1. Suppose the Company JinDong, which is a competitor of Company TaoBao, wants to know some critical
contents of Company TaoBao’s data sets. It corrupts both the cloud and Company 360 by paying large amount
of money.
2. The cloud and Company 360 can collude to derive a new re-encryption key rkTaoBao→JinDong from the old
re-encryption key rkTaoBao→360 and Company 360’s secret key sk360.
3. By using the new re-encryption key rkTaoBao→JinDong , the cloud can transform ciphertext from
(EK(file)||ETaoBao(K)) to be (EK(file)||EJinDong(K)).
4. After obtaining (EK(file)||EJinDong(K)), Company JinDong can decrypt the ciphertexts to obtain the data
content file, which is unpredicted by Company TaoBao.
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One might wonder if Company 360 can directly send the data content to Company JinDong, why it first colludes
with the cloud to derive the new re-encryption key, and then the cloud implements the ciphertext transformation?
The reason lies in the auditing capability: in the first case, Company 360 needs to be online always and thus can
easily be traced; while in the second case, Company 360 can be always offline and untraceable, and the cloud can
claim it is innocent on the new re-encryption key.
1.3 Our Contribution
Aiming at solving this dilemma, we propose a new primitive PRE+ and a new framework Scanf for secure data
sharing service at cloud. Our framework can be employed as a middleware component for effective handling data
storage on demand with organizational separation of the provider and consumer for the newly rapidly emerging
DaaS cloud service. Separating data usage from the software to access the data is a very common practice but it
is at the same time a challenging problem for modern DaaS cloud service. By employing the PRE+ primitive and
the Scanf framework, the cloud can achieve scalable control on which data consumer can access the encrypted the
data. Furthermore, this access can be controlled without worrying about further potential leakage of the data by the
data consumers, for this leakage can be audited. Concretely our contributions are the following:
1. We first point out the dilemma faced by almost all existing secure cloud storage sharing service based on proxy
re-encryption, that is, the malicious delegatee and proxy can collude to re-delegate the re-encryption right to
other users, which can be denoted as the transferable delegation problem.
2. We introduce a new primitive PRE+ which can be seen as dual of traditional proxy re-encryption, where we
also discuss some interesting properties such as non-transferability and message-based fine-grained control on
the delegation. We further analyse why this primitive can be used to solve the transferable delegation problem.
3. We give the definition and security model PRE+. We also construct a concrete chosen ciphertext secure PRE+
scheme in the random oracle model and prove its security as well as analyse its features and performance.
4. Finally, we propose a scalable and controllable cloud data sharing framework for cloud users, denoted Scanf,
based on our PRE+ scheme and provide a rough analysis of its security.
1.4 Related Work
The first PRE scheme was proposed by Blaze et al. in Eurocrypt’98 [7]. But due to some undesirable properties
of this scheme such as bidirectional and collusion-unresistant (the delegatee and the proxy can collude to get the
delegator’s secret key), it did not receive much attention from researchers. In NDSS’05, Ateniese et al. proposed new
unidirectional PRE schemes, discussed nine desirable properties for PRE, namely, unidirectional, non-interactive,
proxy invisibility, original-access, key optimal, collusion-safe, temporary, non-transitive, non-transferable and
finally explored its potential applications especially in distributed secure file systems [1, 2]. Since then,PRE attracts
more and more attention from the researchers in the field. As a matter of fact, many interesting results aboutPRE have
been achieved. From the point view of theoretic construction, different versions ofPRE have been proposed, such as
CCA-secure PRE [8, 13, 30, 33, 34, 49, 48, 35], PRE in the identity based setting [11, 16, 32], PRE in the attribute
based setting [29], PRE in the broadcast setting [12], conditional PRE or type-based PRE [45, 12, 46, 39, 21], key
private PRE [3], PRE with keyword search [36] etc. From the point view of practical application, PRE has found
many interesting applications, such as in encrypted e-mail forwarding [8], key escrow [14], distributed secure file
systems [1, 2], security in publish/subscribe systems [25], multicast [10], secure certified email mailing lists [23, 24],
interoperable architecture of DRM [40], access control [41], privacy for public transformation [17], and securely
obfuscating re-encryption [19] etc. Recently researchers are showing increased interest on using PRE for secure
cloud storage sharing. Liang et al. [27] first proposed the notion of deterministic finite automata-based functional
proxy re-encryption, which combines the feature of DFA-based functional encryption with proxy re-encryption
and discuss its application in secure public cloud data sharing. Later, they also [27] proposed a privacy-preserving
ciphertext multi-sharing control for big data storage mechanism, which is based on the cryptographic primitive
of anonymous multi-hop identity based conditional proxy re-encryption AMH-IBCPRE scheme. Shao et al. [38]
discussed how to use proxy re-encryption for secure mobile cloud service, they designed a framework, which can
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support fine-grained privacy-preserving location-based service framework for mobile devices. At Infocom15 [37],
they designed a fine-grained data sharing mechanism in cloud computing for mobile devices.
1.5 Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we start by informally introducing our new primitive
PRE+ and a rough analysis on its properties. In Section 3, we give some preliminaries which are necessary for
understanding our concrete construction for PRE+. In Section 4, we give the definition and security notions for
PRE+. In Section 5, we give a concrete single-hop PRE+ scheme and prove its security as well as its extension
to multi-hop variants. We also roughly analyse our scheme’s performance and features. In Section 6, we propose
a framework Scanf for secure sharing data in cloud storage. Finally, we conclude our paper with some interesting
open problems in Section 7.
2 A New Primitive PRE+: Dual of Proxy Re-encryption
The rationale for proposing a new scheme is based on the following observation. We observe that all thePRE schemes
until now require the delegator (or the delegator and the delegatee cooperatively) to generate the re-encryption keys,
which can be seen in Fig. 2. However this is not the only way to generate the re-encryption keys. The encrypter
also has this ability, after all, it has the full control on his plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext. We exploit the
possibility of constructing such a PRE scheme, which we denote PRE as PRE+. A graphical description on PRE+
can be seen in Fig. 3.
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Figure 2 Traditional proxy re-encryption
Intuitively, the PRE+ is the dual of the traditional PRE. In the traditional PRE, the receiver of the ciphertexts
(delegator) delegates the decryption right to the delegatee. While in the new PRE+, encrypter-the sender of the
ciphertexts delegates the decryption right to the delegatee. Naturally PRE+ can be categorized as the single-hop
and multi-hop variants. At first sight, the PRE+ seems to be not useful for practical applications. The encrypter
can directly encrypt the message to the delegatee, why there is needed for PRE+ to delegate the decryption
rights? The answer lies in the following facts: First, this delegation can considerably improve the computation and
communication efficiency compared with the twice encryption method. Secondly, the PRE+ can solve some long
standing open problems in PRE like delegation transferability and fine-grained delegation. Thirdly, considering the
multi-hop variants of PRE+, it runs like broadcast encryption except it relies on some semi-trusted proxies. And
these semi-trusted proxies can be easily found in modern networks. Thus it can be well suited for some particular
applications. Finally, PRE+ schemes also have many interesting applications like secure cloud computation and
multicast, etc. Compared with the traditional PRE, PRE+ has the following advantages:
• Fine-grained delegation. For PRE, all the proposed schemes so far can only achieve time-based (such as
[1, 2, 30, 16]) or condition-based (such as [45, 12, 46, 39, 21]) fine-grained delegation. But this situation is not
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Figure 3 PRE+: Dual of proxy re-encryption
fully satisfactory, for the proxy in these schemes can still re-encrypt the delegator’s ciphertext infinitely times
if and only if it is in the valid time or with the valid condition. Many practical applications do not need this
property as it is preferable that the delegator can control on the messages the proxy can re-encrypt. Using our
PRE+ scheme this problem can be easily solved. Indeed, in PRE+, the value that can control the delegation
is the encrypter’s ephemeral randomness. If we follow this principle, then the encrypter needs to use the same
ephemeral randomness for the delegated messages. If the encrypter wants to allow the proxy to re-encrypt the
message, it encrypts the message with the “same” ephemeral randomness. Otherwise it encrypts the message
with a “different” ephemeral randomness. Thus, we can see that the encrypter can easily achieve message-based
fine-grained control on the delegation.
• Non-transferable delegation. Non-transferable delegation means that, if the delegator A delegates the re-
encryption right for the delegatee B to the proxy P , P and B can not collude to delegate, representingA, new
re-encryption right for any other user. For PRE, all the schemes until now cannot solve this problem naturally.
For example, in [30], the authors remarked that constructing systems withstanding the transfer of delegation
attacks remained as open problems. Although some researchers try to solve this open problem [44, 43, 18] in
the identity based setting, but their proposals heavily rely on the PKG, which is not a very natural solution.
Again in our PRE+ scheme this problem can be solved very naturally. In the PRE+, the encrypter computes
the re-encryption key by using his ephemeral randomness for the messages and the delegatee’s public key. The
normal ciphertext receiver A will now be independent with the delegatee B and the proxy P , now if B and P
can not collude to derive the ephemeral randomness, it will be non-transferable.
The multi-hop PRE+ runs likely the broadcast encryption (BE), for both primitives can be viewed as the
encryption primitive dealing with one encrypter but many receivers. We here also discuss the difference between
PRE+ and BE. Obviously, multi-hop PRE+ relies heavily on the physical objects, the semi-trusted proxies. But we
remark that PRE+ has its own advantages compared with BE for some particular applications.
• Scalability. Generically speaking, BE is a primitive tailorable to the scenario of one encrypter (encrypting
messages) to many receivers. When designing the BE schemes, researchers focused on its efficiency including
the communication cost such as the ciphertext length, public/private key size and the computation cost, while
payed little attention on its scalability. When a new user joins or an old user leaves the receiver set, in some
cases, the encrypter has to compute and send the ciphertext again for the whole receiver set or the whole system
setup has to be rebooted. For multi-hop PRE+, the scalability issue can be solved smoothly. If a new user joins
or an old user leaves the receiver set, what is needed to do is the delegator (encrypter) adjust the new user’s
nearest proxy’s re-encryption key, which is a very easy task.
• Efficiency. In currentBE schemes, researchers always have to make some trade-off between size of the ciphertext
and public/private keys, for example, The best known fully collusion resistant BE scheme is the BGW scheme,
proposed by Boneh, Gentry and Waters in Eurocrypt’05 [5], which can achieve O(√n)-size ciphertexts and
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public key; others chemes can achieve constant size ciphertext,O(n)-size public key and constant size private
keys. While in thePRE+ scheme, the constant size of ciphertext and public/private keys can be easily achieved.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Bilinear Map
Let G and GT be two groups of order p for some large prime p. A bilinear map e : G×G→ GT between these
two groups satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinear: We say that a map e : G×G→ GT is bilinear if e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab for all P,Q ∈ G and
a, b ∈ ZZp.
• Non-degenerative: The map does not send all pairs in G×G to the identity in GT . We observe that G, G are
groups of prime order, this implies that if P is a generator of G then e(P, P ) is a generator of GT .
• Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for any P,Q ∈ G.
We denote BSetup as an algorithm that, on input the security parameter 1k, it outputs the parameters for a bilinear
map as (p, g,G,GT , e), where p ∈ Θ(2k).
3.2 Complexity Assumptions
Let (p, g,G,GT , e) be a bilinear group of prime order p and P be its generator. Here we define the extended
decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (eDBDH) assumption, extended decisional linear (eDL) assumption and variant
of discrete logarithm (vDL) assumption.
eDBDH Problem. Let (p, g,G,GT , e)← BSetup(1k) The eDBDH problem is as follows: given given
(g, ga, gab, gcd/b, gcde/b, gcf , gb/e, gued/bgsf , T ) or random. for some a, b, c, d, e ∈ Z∗p and T ∈ GT , decide
whether T = e(g, g)ad. An algorithm A has advantage  in solving eDBDH problem if
|Pr[A(g, ga, gab, gcd/b, gcde/b, gcf , gb/e, gued/bgsf , e(g, g)ad) = 0]
−Pr[A(g, ga, gab, gcd/b, gcde/b, gcf , gb/e, gued/bgsf , T ) = 0]| ≥ 
where the probability is over the random choices of a, b, c, d, e, u, f, s in Z∗p , the random choices of T in GT , the
random choice of g ∈ G∗, and the random bits of A.
Definition 3.1: (eDBDH Assumption) We say that the -eDBDH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm has
advantage at least  in solving the eDBDH problem.
eDL Problem. Let (p, g,G,GT , e)← BSetup(1k). The eDL problem is as follows: Given
(g, gα2 , gα1α2α4 , gα3 , gα1α3α5 , gα1α4u), decide whether T = gα5−α4 . An algorithm A has advantage  in solving
eDL problem if
|Pr[A(g, gα2 , gα1α2α4 , gα3 , gα1α3α5 , gα1α4u, gα5−α4) = 0]
−Pr[A(g, gα2 , gα1α2α4 , gα3 , gα1α3α5 , gα1α4u, T ) = 0]| ≥ 
where the probability is over the random choices of α1, α2, · · · , α5, u in Z∗p , the random choices of T in GT , the
random choice of g ∈ G, and the random bits of A.
Definition 3.2: (eDL Assumption) We say that the -eDL assumption holds if no PPT algorithm has advantage
at least  in solving the eDL problem.
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vDL Problem. Let (p, g,G,GT , e)← BSetup(1k). The vDL problem is as follows: Given
(gβ1 , guβ2/β1 , gβ2−β3 , gβ2/β1), compute (β2, β1), An algorithm A has advantage  in solving vDL problem if
|Pr[A(gβ1 , guβ2/β1 , gβ2−β3 , gβ2/β1) = (β2, β1)]| ≥ 
where the probability is over the random choices of β1, β2, β3, u inZ∗p , the random choice of g ∈ G, and the random
bits of A.
Definition 3.3: (vDL Assumption) We say that the -vDL assumption holds if no PPT algorithm has advantage
at least  in solving the vDL problem.
4 Definition and Security Model for PRE+
4.1 Definition
Definition 4.1: PRE+ (Dual of proxy re-encryption) scheme is a tuple of algorithms PRE+.KeyGen,
PRE+.ReKeyGen, PRE+.Enc, PRE+.ReEnc, PRE+.Dec)
PRE+.KeyGen(1k)→ (pk, sk): On input the security parameter 1k, this algorithm outputs the decrypter’s public
key/secret key pair (pk1, sk1) and the delegatee’s public/secret key pair (pk2, sk2). Here we emphasis that
in PRE+, the delegator is the encrypter, while in traditional PRE the delegator is the decrypter (ciphertext
receiver).
PRE+.Enc(pk1,m)→ C2: On input a public key pk1, ephemeral randomness consisting of (r, r′) 1, a message
m ∈ {0, 1}n, this algorithm (the encrypter) outputs a second-level ciphertext C2.
PRE+.ReKeyGen(r′, pk1, pk2)→ rk1→2: On input ephemeral randomness r′ for pk1, public key pk2, this
algorithm (the encrypter) outputs a re-encryption key rk1→2.
PRE+.ReEnc(rk1→2, C2)→ C1: On input a re-encryption key rk1→2 and a ciphertext C2, this algorithm (the
proxy) outputs a first-level ciphertext C1 or the error symbol ⊥.
PRE+.Dec2(sk2, C2): On input a secret key sk2 and a second-level ciphertext C2, this algorithm (the decrypter)
outputs a message m ∈ {0, 1}n or ⊥.
PRE+.Dec1(sk1, C1): On input a secret key sk1 and a first-level ciphertext C1, this algorithm (the delegatee)
outputs a message m ∈ {0, 1}n or ⊥.
Roughly speaking, the correctness requires that, for all (pki, ski)← PRE+.KeyGen(1k) and (pkj , skj)←
PRE+.KeyGen(1k), it holds that
PRE+.Dec2(ski,PRE
+.Enc(pki,m)) = m.
PRE+.Dec1(skj ,PRE
+.ReEnc(PRE+.ReKeyGen(r′, pk1, pk2),PRE+.Enc(pki,m)) = m.
4.2 Security Models
We start by giving some definitions.
Definition 4.2: (CCA-security for the Second-level Ciphertext). A single-use unidirectional PRE+ scheme is
CCA-secure for the second-level ciphertext if the advantage of any PPT adversaryA in the following game played
between a challenger C and A is negligible in the security parameter k. Note that we work in the static corruption
model, where the adversary should decide the corrupted users before the game starts.
Setup: The Challenger sets up the system parameters.
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Phase 1: The adversary A adaptively issues queries q1, · · · , qn1 where query qi is one of:
• Opk: On input an index i, the Challenger takes a security parameter k, and responds by running algorithm
PRE+.KeyGen(1k) to generate a key pair (pki, ski), gives pki to A and records (pki, ski) in table TK .
• Osk: On input pki by A, where pki is from Opk, if pki is corrupted, the Challenger searches pki in table
TK and returns ski; otherwise, the Challenger returns ⊥.
• Ork: On input (pki, pkj) by A, where pki, pkj are from Opk, the Challenger returns the re-encryption
key rkpki→pkj = PRE+.ReKeyGen(r′, pki, pkj), where ski is the secret key corresponding to pki.
• Ore: On input (pki, pkj , C) by A, where pki, pkj are from Opk, the Challenger returns the re-
encrypted ciphertext C ′ = PRE+.ReEnc(PRE+.ReKeyGen(r′, pki, pkj), C), where sk is the secret key
corresponding to pk.
• Odec: On input (pki, Ci), where pki is from Opk, the Challenger returns PRE+.Dec1(ski, Ci) or
PRE+.Dec2(ski, Ci), where ski is the secret key corresponding to pki.
Challenge: Once the adversaryA decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length plaintexts m0, m1 from
the message space, and a public key pk∗ on which it wishes to challenge. There are three constraints on the
public key pk∗, (i) it is from Opk; (ii) it is uncorrupted; (iii) if (pk∗,F) did appear in any query to Ork, then
F is uncorrupted. The Challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets
C∗ = PRE+.Enc(pk∗,mb)
It sends C∗ as the challenge to A.
Phase 2: The adversary A adaptively issues more queries qn1+1, · · · , qn, but with the following restrictions.
• Ork: On input (pki, pkj) by A, the following requirements should be all satisfied.
– pki and pkj are from Opk;
– if pki = pk∗, then pkj is uncorrupted.
• Ore: On input (pki, pkj , Ci) by A, the following requirements should be all satisfied.
– pki and pkj are from Opk;
– if (pki, Ci) is a derivative, the Challenger outputs ⊥. Otherwise the challenger returns C ′ =
PRE+.ReEnc(PRE+.ReKeyGen(r′, pki, pkj), Ci). Derivatives of (pk∗, C∗) are defined as follows:
1. (pk∗, C∗) is a derivative of itself.
2. If (pk, C) is a derivative of (pk∗, C∗) and (pk′, C ′) is a derivative of (pk,C), then (pk′, C ′) is a
derivative of (pk∗, C∗).
3. IfA has queriedOre on input (pk, pk′, C) and obtained (pk′, C ′), then (pk′, C ′) is a derivative of
(pk, C).
4. If A has queried Ork on input (pk, pk′), and C ′ = PRE+.ReEnc(Ore(r′, pk, pk′), C), then
(pk′, C ′) is a derivative of (pk, C).
• Odec: On input (pki, Ci), if the following requirements are all satisfied, the Challenger responds as in
Phase 1; otherwise, the Challenger outputs ⊥.
– pki is from Opk;
– (pki, Ci) is not a derivative of (pk∗, C∗).
Guess: Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b = b′.
We define adversary A’s advantage in attacking PRE+ as
Adv2CCAPRE+ = |Pr[b = b′]−
1
2
|.
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Definition 4.3: (CCA-security for the First-level Ciphertext.) A single-use unidirectional PRE+ scheme is
CCA-secure for the first-level ciphertext if the advantage of any PPT adversary A in the following game played
between a challenger C and A is negligible in the security parameter k. Note that we work in the static corruption
model, where the adversary should decide the corrupted users before the game starts.
Setup: The Challenger sets up the system parameters.
Phase 1: The adversary A adaptively issues queries q1, · · · , qn1 where query qi is one of:
• Opk: Same as the above definition.
• Osk: Same as the above definition.
• Ork: Same as the above definition.
• Ore: Same as the above definition.
• Odec: On input (pki, Ci), where pki is fromOpk, the Challenger returns PRE+.Dec1(ski, Ci), where ski
is the secret key corresponding to pki.
Challenge: Once the adversaryA decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length plaintexts m0, m1 from
the message space, and two public keys pk∗, pk on which it wishes to challenge. There are two constraints on
the public key pk∗, (i) it is fromOpk; (ii) it is uncorrupted. The Challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and
sets
C∗ = PRE+.ReEnc(PRE+.ReKeyGen(r′, pk, pk∗),PRE+.Enc(pk,mb))
It sends C∗ as the challenge to A.
Phase 2: The adversary A adaptively issues more queries qn1+1, · · · , qn, but with the following restrictions.
• Ork: On input (pki, pkj) by A, the following requirements should be all satisfied.
– pki and pkj are from Opk;
• Odec: On input (pki, Ci), if the following requirement is satisfied, the Challenger responds as in Phase 1;
otherwise, the Challenger outputs ⊥.
– pki is from Opk;
Guess: Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b = b′.
We define adversary A’s advantage in attacking PRE+ as
Adv1CCAPRE+ = |Pr[b = b′ −
1
2
|.
Remark 1. In the first-level ciphertext security game, the challenge ciphertext is a re-encrypted ciphertext.
Note that, in a single-hop unidirectional PRE+ scheme, since the first level ciphertext cannot be re-encrypted, the
adversary should be allowed to obtain any re-encryption keys, even including those from the target public key pk∗
to other public keys which are corrupted. Furthermore, since A is allowed to obtain any re-encryption keys, there
is no need to provide the re-encryption oracle and the second level decryption oracle for him.
Definition 4.4: (Collusion Resistant Security.) A single-use unidirectional PRE+ is collusion resistant under an
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack if no polynomial bounded adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against
the Challenger in the following game. Here, we also work in the static corruption model.
Setup: The Challenger sets up the system parameters.
Find: Almost the same as Phase 1 in the above game, except that there is no re-encryption oracle in this game,
since the adversary can get every re-encryption key.
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Output: Finally, the adversaryA outputs the randomness, which used to generate re-encryption key (According to
the above algorithm notation, we can denote it as r′), and wins the game if the corresponding public key pk is
uncorrupted.
We define adversary A’s advantage in attacking PRE+ as
AdvCRPRE+ = Pr[A wins].
5 Our Scheme Construction
5.1 The Proposed Single-hop PRE+ Scheme
Our construction is based on [22] and the following is our concrete scheme:
1. Setup(k): On input the security parameter k, the setup algorithm outputs the system parameter
(g, p,G,GT , e)→ BSetup(k), hash functions H1, H2, H3 and a random generator g′ ∈ G, where H1(·) :
{0, 1}∗ → Z∗p , ,H2(·) : GT → {0, 1}l, H3(·) : G2 ×GT × {0, 1}l ×G4 → G.
2. KeyGen(k): On input the security parameter k, the key generation algorithm outputs a (public key, private
key) pair (pk1 = gx1 , sk1 = x1) for the decrypter, a (public key, private key) pair (pk2 = gx2 , sk2 = x2) for
the delegatee where x1, x2 ∈ Z∗p .
3. Encrypt(m, pk1):On input a messagem ∈ {0, 1}l, fixed randomness (t, r1) and unfixed randomness (r, k1, pi)
from Z∗p , and a public key pk1, the regular encryption algorithm outputs C = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, c9)
where
r = H1(m,h), c1 = g
r, c2 = g
tr, c3 = h · e(g, g)rr1 ,
c4 = m⊕H2(h), c5 = pk
r1
t
1 , c6 = pk
k1r1
t
1 , c7 = pk
pi
1 ,
c8 = g
t
k1 , c9 = g
′ k1r1t H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||c5||c6||c7||c8||pk1)pi
where h is a random element from GT .
4. ReKeyGen(pk2, Randomness (r1, t), pk1): The encrypter gives the proxy the re-encryption key
rkpk1→pk2 = (pk
r2
t
2 , g
r2g−r1 , g′
r2
t , gt)
where r2 is a random number from Z∗p .
5. ReEnc(C, rkpk1→pk2): On input the ciphertext C, the proxy outputs C ′ = (c′1, c′2, c′3, c′4, c′5, c′6, c′7,
c′8, c
′
9):
c′1 = c1, c
′
2 = c2, c
′
3 = c3 · e(c1, gr2g−r1) = h · e(g, g)rr2 ,
c′4 = c4, c
′
5 = pk
r2
t
2 , c
′
6 = pk
k2r2
t
2 , c
′
7 = pk
pi′
2 , c
′
8 = g
t
k2 ,
c′9 = g
′ k2r2t H3(c′1||c′2||c′3||c′4||c′5||c′6||c′7||c′8||pk2)pi
′
where pi′, k2. are randomly chosen from Z∗p .
6. Decrypt(C, sk): it runs as follows:
• On input a second-level ciphertext C, and a secret key sk1, the decryption algorithm is as follows:
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– First check whether
e(c9, pk1) = e(g
′, c6)e(H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||c5||c6||c7||c8||pk1), c7)
if it does not hold, output ⊥ and terminate, otherwise do the following.
– Compute h = c3/e(c2, c5)
1
x .
– Compute m = c4 ⊕H2(h).
– Compute r = H1(m,h).
– Output m, if c1 = gr, ⊥ otherwise.
• On input a first-level ciphertext C ′, and a secret key sk2, the decryption algorithm decrypts as the above,
for these two level ciphertexts share the same structure.
Remark 2. Roughly speaking, this scheme can be viewed as combining two parts: the BF-IBE part and the
Waters signature part. Note that c4 is computed by the scheme BF [4], and c6, c7, c9 are computed by the strongly
unforgeable variant [6] of Waters scheme [42]. Thus our scheme’s security roughly can be based on the security of
BF-IBE and Waters signature.
Remark 3. By combing randomness (r, r1, pi) and the introduced randomness (k, t), we can instantiate the
concept of PRE+ and prove its security. It should be noted that our scheme can be simplified or more natural
schemes in the standard model can be constructed, we leave them as important open problems.
5.2 Security Analysis
Theorem 5.1: Our proposal is PRE+-CCA-secure in the random oracle model for the second level ciphertext
under assumptions that the eDBDH problem and eDL problem are hard.
Proof. We incrementally define a sequence of games starting at the real attack (Game G0), and ending up at
Game G9, which clearly shows that the adversary cannot break the system. We define Ei to be the event b = b′ in
GameGi, where b is the bit involved in the challenge phase, and b′ is the output ofA in the Guess phase. Note in our
scheme, the two-level ciphertexts share the same structure, thus the decryption oracle for the first level ciphertext
and the decryption oracle the second level ciphertext are same, thus in the following Games, we just consider one
decryption oracle.
• Game G0. This game corresponds to the real attack. By definition,
|Pr[E0]− 1/2| = Adv2CCAPRE+(k) (1)
• Game G1. In this game, we modify the hash functions to the random oracles.
– Oh1 : On input a stringS, the Challenger checks whether (S, r(1)) exists in TableTh1 . If it is, the Challenger
returns r(1); otherwise, the challenger chooses a random number r(1) from Z∗p , returns r
(1), and records
(S, r(1)) into Table Th1 .
– Oh2 : On input a string S, the Challenger checks whether (S,R(2)) exists in TableTh2 . If it is, the Challenger
returns R(2); otherwise, the Challenger chooses a random number R(2) from {0, 1}l, returns R(2), and
records (S,R(2)) into Table Th2 .
– Oh3 : On input a string c1||c2||c3||c4||c5||||c6||c7||c8||pk, the Challenger checks whether
(c1||c2||c3||c4||c5||||c6||c7||c8||pk,R(3), ∗) exists in Table Th3 . If it is, the Challenger returns R(3);
otherwise, the Challenger chooses a random number r(3) from Z∗p , returns R
(3) = pkr
(3)
, and records
(c1||c2||c3||c4||c5||||c6||c7||c8||pk,R(3), r(3)) in Table Th3 .
• Game G2. In this game, we modify Oh1 and the challenge phase by setting h = h∗, where h is a random
number from Z∗p .
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– Oh1 : On input a string mb||h∗, the Challenger aborts. Other performances are the same as those in Oh1
which we first mention.
– Challenge: The Challenger sets h = h∗, other performances are the same as those in Oh1 which we first
mention.
It is easy to see that only if the adversary never queries Oh1 with mb||h∗, Game G2 and Game G1 are
indistinguishable. Hence, we have
|Pr[E2 − E1] ≤ qh1
p
where qh1 is the maximum number of queries to Oh1 (including the number the Challenger queries Oh1 ).
• Game G3. In this game, we set g′ = g+1(6= g) = gu, where u is chosen randomly from Z∗p . The Challenger
knows a value logg−1g = 1/u satisfying e(g−1, g+1) = e(g, g). It is easy to see that Game G3 and Game G2
are indistinguishable.
Pr[E3] = Pr[E2]
• Game G4. In this game, we modify the re-encryption oracle and the decryption oracle as follows.
– Ore: On input (pki, pkj , C), if (pk∗, C∗) = (pki, C) and pkj is uncorrupted, the Challenger records
(pkj , Encrypt(pkj , Odec(pki, C))) into Table Tre. Other performances are the same as that inGameG3.
– Odec: On input (pki, Ci), if pki is uncorrupted, the Challenger checks whether (pki, Ci) exists in Table
Tre. If yes, the Challenger outputs ⊥. Other performances are the same as that in Game G4. Note that
Table Tre is used to record the derivatives of the second level challenge ciphertext from Ore.
we can easily obtain that
Pr[E4] = Pr[E3]
• Game G5. In this game, we modify the decryption oracle as follows.
– Odec: The Challenger only changes the method of doing the decryption for the uncorrupted public keys
as follows, and other performances are the same as that in Game G4.
1. Set a set S = φ.
2. Find (S, r(1)) in Table Th1 , such that g
r(1) = c1,m
′||h′ = S, c4 = m′ ⊕H2(h′).
3. If S = φ, then output ⊥ and terminate. Otherwise, do the following.
4. Choose the first pair (S, r(1)) from S, and set S = S/(S, r(1)).
5. If h′ = c3/e(c9/cr
(3)
7 , c8)
r(1)/u and e(c9, pki) = e(g′, c6)e(H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||c5||c6||c7||c8||
pki), c7) both hold, output m′ and terminate; otherwise, go to Step 3. Note that r(3) is the associated
value to (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, pki) in Th3 , and
H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||c5||c6||c7||c8||pki) = pkr(3)i
In Game G5, the Challenger decrypts the ciphertext not by using the secret key but the random oracles (Oh1 ,
Oh2 andOh3 ). Hence, Game G5 and Game G4 would be different, if the adversary guessed the correct value
of H1(m||h) without querying Oh1 or guessed the correct value of H2(h) without querying Oh2 or guessed
the correct value of H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||c5||c6||c7||
c8||pki) without querying Oh3 . The probability of this issue is (qh2/p+ qh3/2l + qh3/p) at most. As a result,
we have that
|Pr[E5]− Pr[E4]| ≤ qdec(qh2/p+ qh3/2l + qh3/p)
where qh1 , qh2 , qh3 is the maximum number of queries toOh1 , Oh2 , Oh3 (including the number the Challenger
queries Oh1 , Oh2 , Oh3 ).
• Game G6. In this game, we continue to modify the decryption oracle as follows.
14 X. Wang et al.
– It is almost the same as that in Game G5, except that if pki is corrupted, and the plaintext is ⊥ obtained
in the previous performances, the Challenger additionally performs the following.
1. If e(c9, pki) = e(g′, c6)e(H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||c5||c6||c7||c8||pki), c7) holds, do the following steps;
otherwise, output ⊥ and terminate.
2. Set S1 = S2 = S ′2.
3. Search (rk1pk∗→pki , rk
2
pk∗→pki , rk
3
pk∗→pki , rk
4
pk∗→pki) in Table Trk (where Trk records the re-
encryption keys which have returned to the adversary), and put all (rk1pk∗→pki ,
rk2pk∗→pki , rk
3
pk∗→pki , rk
4
pk∗→pki) into the set S1.
4. Search (S, r(1)) in Table Th1 , such that m
′||h′ = S, c4 = m′ ⊕H2(h′), and c1 = gr(1) , and then put
all (S, r(1)) into set S2 and S ′2.
5. If S1 = φ or S2 = φ, then output ⊥ and terminate. Otherwise, do the following.
6. Choose the first pair (rk1pk∗→pki , rk
2
pk∗→pki , rk
3
pk∗→pki , rk
4
pk∗→pki) from S1, and set S1 =
S1/(rk1pk∗→pki , rk2pk∗→pki , rk3pk∗→pki , rk4pk∗→pki)
7. Choose the first pair (S, r(1)) from S2, and set S2 = S2/(S, r(1)).
8. If c′3 = c3e(c9/c
r(3)
7 , g
t
k1 )
r(1)
u where r(3) is the associated value to (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8,
pki) in Th3 .
9. If S1 = φ, output ⊥; otherwise, do the following steps.
10. If S2 = φ, then set S2 = S ′2 and go to Step 5; otherwise, go to Step 6.
Note that if the input regular ciphertext is computed from ReEnc, the verifying equation in step 8 must hold.
Hence, the modification in this game does not make Game G6 different from Game G5. As a result, we have
that
Pr[E6] = Pr[E5]
• Game G7. In this game, we continue to modify the re-encryption key generation oracle as follows.
– Ork: On input (pki, pkj), if pki 6= pk∗, then the Challenger returns (pkr2/tj , gr2g−r1 , g′r2/t, gt) where
(r1, t) are fixed randomness chosen by the challenger in advance, and r2 is randomly chosen from Z∗p .
Other performances are the same as those in Game G6.
It is easy to see that Game G7 and Game G6 are indistinguishable. Hence, we have that
Pr[E7] = Pr[E6]
• Game G8. In this game, we modify the re-encryption oracle as follows.
– Ork: On input (pki, pkj), if pki = pk∗, the pkj is uncorrupted, then the Challenger returns
(A,B,C,D, pkj) where A,B,C are random elements from G, and e(A, g′) = e(C, pkj) and D is fixed
as gt. Other performances are the same as those in Game G7.
We have the following analysis on the difference between Game G7 and Game G8.
– Odec and Ore do not use the secret keys of the uncorrupted users in Game G7.
Note that due to the modification in Game G6, the decryption oracle cannot help to verify the modification
on Ork. In Game G6, it is guaranteed that the first level ciphertexts from ReEnc(Ork, C) can be decrypted
properly.
Hence, if the adversary without knowing 1/u can verify the modification on Ork, we can build an algorithm
to solve the eDL hard problem. In particular, set t = 1/α1, pki = gα2 , r1 = α4, pk
r1/t
i = g
α1α2α4 , pkj =
gα3 , r2 = α5, (pkj)
r2/t = gα1α3α5 , (g′)r2/t = gα1α4u, we can not calculate the value of gr2g−r1 = gα5−α4 .
Here we do not consider the information about (r2, r1) leaked from (c2, c3, c6, c8, c9, c′2, c
′
3, c
′
6, c
′
8, c
′
9) for
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these value all are completely random for randomness (r, (r, h), k1, (k1, pi), r, (r, h), k2, (k2, pi′)). Hence we
have that
|Pr[E8]− Pr[E7]| ≤ qrk · eDL
where qrk is the maximum number of queries to Ork.
• Game G9. In this game, we modify the challenge phase as follows.
– Challenge: The challenge ciphertext is
r = a, c∗1 = g
r = ga, t = b, c∗2 = g
tr = gab, c∗3 = h
∗T, c∗4 = mb ⊕H2(h∗), pk1 = gc,
r1 = d, c
∗
5 = pk
r1/t
1 = g
cd/b, k1 = e, c
∗
6 = pk
k1r1/t
1 = g
cde/b, pi = f, c7 = pk
pi
1 = g
cf ,
c8 = g
t/k1 = gb/e, H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||c5||c6||c7||c8||pk1) = gs,
c9 = g
′ k1r1t H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||c5||c6||c7||c8||pk1)pi = gued/bgsf
The rest of performances are the same as those in previous game. Note that in the above we implicitly
set H1(m,h) = a, and T is a random number. If the adversary can distinguish Game G9 and Game
G8, we can build an algorithm B that solves the eDBDH problem. The eDBDH problem is, given
(ga, gab, gcd/b, gcde/b, gcf , gb/e, gued/bgsf , T ) and decide if T = e(g, g)ad or random. it is clear that Game
G9 is the same as Game G8. Hence, we have that
|Pr[E9]− Pr[E8]| ≤ eDBDH
Furthermore, it is clear that in Game G9
Pr[E9] = 1/2
since T is a random element.
As a result, combining the above equations among the Games, we get the theorem proved.
Theorem 5.2: Our proposal is PRE+-CCA-secure in the random oracle model for the first level ciphertext under
assumptions that the eDBDH problem and eDL problem are hard.
We can use a similar method in the proof of the above Theorem 5.1 to prove this theorem, for the first level
ciphertext and the second level ciphertext share the same structure, here we omit the details..
Theorem 5.3: Our PRE+ proposal is collusion-resistent under assumption that vDL problem is hard.
Here when the proxy and the delegatee collude, they can compute (g
r2
t , gr2g−r1 , g′
r2
t , gt), but this does not
help them compute (r1, t) under the eDL problem, which is the randomness used to generate re-encryption keys.
The vDL problem is, given (gβ1 , guβ2/β1 , gβ2−β3 , gβ2/β1), compute (β2, β1), which is difficult. Thus our PRE+
proposal is collusion-resistent.
5.3 Feature Comparison and Performance Analysis
In this subsection, we first give the feature comparison results with related work, which can be seen in Table 1.
From this table, we can see that our scheme can achieve most useful properties for cloud storage, such as being
unidirectional, CCA-secure, supporting conditional delegation, collusion-safe, without cost bilinear pairing, non-
transferable and fine-grained message-level delegation. Especially, for the last two properties, non-transferability
and message-level delegation, until now almost no natural proxy re-encryption schemes could be achieved.
Further, we give the performance analysis results, which can be seen in Table 2. Here we just compare with
scheme [22], on which we construct our scheme. Here tm denotes the computation time for modular exponentiation
and tp denotes the computation time for bilinear pairing, |G| denotes the length of one group element in |G|, |GT |
denotes the length of one group element inGT , l denotes the length of the message or the length of the hash function
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Table 1 Feature Comparison
Schemes Unidirectional (R)CCA-secure Conditional Collusion-safe Without pairing Non-transferable Message-level delegation
[1] Yes No No Yes No No No
[8] No Yes No No No No No
[13] No Yes Yes No Yes No No
[22] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
[31] Yes Yes No Yes No No No
[46] Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Our Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
H2’s output (our scheme can be easily modified to handle arbitrary length message). From this table we can see
that our scheme is a little less efficient than scheme of [22], but our scheme can achieve many other interesting
properties, while their scheme can not achieve them. Furthermore, we believe that there can be far more efficient
PRE+ schemes than this scheme, which is just a proof of concept, we leave designing such schemes as our future
work.
Table 2 Computation cost
Scheme Enc Check Reenc Dec Ciph-Len
1ndCiph 2ndCiph 1stCiph 2ndCiph
[22] 2tm + 1tp 2tp 5tm + 1tp 2tp 4tp + 3tm 4|G| + 1|GT | + |l| 3|G| + |l|
Our 1tp + 8te 3tp 5tm + 1tp 2tm + 4tp 2tm + 4tp 7|G| + 1|GT | + |l| 7|G| + 1|GT | + |l|
5.4 Extention to a Multi-hop Variant
Our single-hop PRE+ scheme can be easily extended to a multi-hop variant. Below is the concrete scheme:
1. Setup(1k): Same as the single-hop scheme.
2. Keygen(1k): Same as the single-hop scheme.
3. Encrypt(m, pki−1): Same as the single-hop scheme.
4. ReKeyGen(pki, Randomness (ri−1, t), pki−1): The encrypter gives the proxy the re-encryption key
rkpki = (pk
ri
t
i , g
rig−ri−1 , g′
ri
t , gt)
where ri is a random number from Z∗p , and the encrypter records ri for the next hop’s re-encryption key
generation.
5. ReEnc(C, rkpki−1→pki ): Same as the single-hop scheme.
6. Decrypt(C, ski): Same as the single-hop scheme.
Remark 4. Note in this scheme the ciphertext remains constant no matter how many times it has been re-encrypted.
This is a very desirable feature in practical applications. We emphasise the construction of constant-size ciphertext
multi-hop CCA-secure traditional PRE scheme remains as a very important open problem until now. We also note
the encrypter needs to remember the randomness ri for the (i+ 1) hop’s re-encryption key generation, which will
restrict its employment. We leave construction of new multi-hop PRE+ scheme, which need not remember the
randomness as an important open problem.
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6 Scanf: A scalable and controllable secure cloud data sharing framework
In this section, we describe a scalable and controllable secure cloud data sharing framework, denoted as Scanf,
based on the primitive PRE+, which can be seen in Fig. 4.
EVirtul(K)EK(file)
EBob(K)
rkVÆB
PRE+ (skBob)
+
(rkAÆ?)
×Non-transferable
Alice Bob
Proxy        
Figure 4 PRE+ in Secure Cloud Computation
In this framework, there are four kinds of parties. The first kind is the client users, denoted as Alice, which
outsources data contents to the Cloud. The second one is the infrastructure provider, the Cloud, which stores and
manages client users’ outsouring data contents. The third one is the data users (sharers), denoted as Bob, which
will access Alice’s data contents. The final one is the access controller, denoted as proxy, which does the ciphertext
transformation process (note here the proxy can be the Cloud). In order to protect her outsourced data’s privacy,
Alice first encrypts her data contents. Here we assume Alice first constructs a virtual user Virtual, which she knows
its private/public key. Then Alice encrypts her data content under a symmetrical key K, and then encrypts K
under the public key of Virtual, and outsources them to Cloud. After knowing Bob’s public key, she assigns the
re-encryption key rkv→B to the proxy. When data user Bob wants to access the content of Alice, he relies on the
proxy doing the re-encryption from V toB with rkv→B . In this process, the proxy cannot know the content, neither
he can get any information on private keys of Virtual and Bob.
One might argue that the traditional PRE can also do this job. But our point is that our Scanf framework based
on PRE+ performs very well on the non-transferable and message level based fine-grained delegation issues.
In the current state of the art, almost there exist no PRE schemes with non-transferable property, and no IBPRE
schemes with non-transferable property without the help ofPKG [44], while relying onPKG is not a good choice for
practical applications. That means, if using PRE in this framework, the proxy and Bob can collude to representing
Alice, to make new delegations to new users. Obviously, this contradicts Alice’s original intention. Similarly, in the
current state, all the PRE schemes cannot handle the fine-grained delegation at the message based level. This will
be inconvenient as Alice has no control on which content will be re-encrypted. She has to incorporate the condition
or type or time information in her content if she uses the conditional or type or time based PRE. While in PRE+,
Alice can easily control on which content will be re-encrypted and which will be not. Thus our framework can
achieve good scalability and controllability, which is important for secure data sharing in cloud storage.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a new primitive:PRE+, which is the dual ofPRE. We have discussed the differences
with existing primitives PRE and BE. We also give the definition and a security model for this new primitive,
construct a concrete single-hop scheme and prove its IND-CCA security, and finally,extend it to a multi-hop scheme.
Based on our scheme, we proposed a scalable and controllable secure cloud data sharing framework, denoted Scanf,
which is useful for practical applications of data storage.
In our future work we would like to explore other issues such as finding interesting applications of PRE+,
constructing other variants of single-hop and multi-hop PRE+ schemes based on different assumptions, exploring
the relationship between PRE+ and other cryptographic primitives like proxy encryption, etc.
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